I. INTRODUCTION {#sec1}
===============

Over the past two decades, we have witnessed a striking increase in scholarly attention for the overlap between law and neuroscience.[^1^](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} This is not surprising, as rapidly advancing neurosciences have provided fascinating new findings about the functioning of the human brain, while unprecedented novel technologies have revolutionized techniques for exploring the brain. This has prompted new discussions and reopened a number of old theoretical discussions on a whole range of essential criminal-law issues. They range from deeply philosophical inquiries into the questions of the free will and criminal responsibility[^2^](#fn2){ref-type="fn"} to a plethora of factual and legal evidentiary dilemmas,[^3^](#fn3){ref-type="fn"} (mental) privacy issues,[^4^](#fn4){ref-type="fn"} and ethical controversies on interventions in the brain under the auspices of criminal justice systems.[^5^](#fn5){ref-type="fn"} The increased theoretical consideration for these topics has not circumvented Slovenia, a small Central European country with a typical continental criminal-law system.[^6^](#fn6){ref-type="fn"}

At the same time, neuroscience has also found its way to criminal courts all around the world.[^7^](#fn7){ref-type="fn"} Reports and anecdotes about criminal cases in which neuroscience played an important, but controversial role stirred heated debates among legal and neuroscience scholars as well as among the public.[^8^](#fn8){ref-type="fn"} Yet, based on individual cases alone, it is impossible to assess the prevalence and the impact of neuroscience in criminal courts overall. For such an assessment, systematic empirical research is needed. However, against a backdrop of a large body of theoretical work on the use of neuroscience in criminal law *de lege ferenda* one is surprised to find very little empirical research on the use of neuroscience in criminal justice systems *de lege lata*. In fact, we could only identify a handful of studies attempting to paint a more comprehensive picture about the use of neuroscience in particular criminal justice systems. Moreover, except for one Dutch study,[^9^](#fn9){ref-type="fn"} all the research was conducted in common-law criminal justice systems: three studies in the USA,[^10^](#fn10){ref-type="fn"} one in England and Wales,[^11^](#fn11){ref-type="fn"} and one in Canada.[^12^](#fn12){ref-type="fn"} Thus, little is known about how neuroscience shapes the outcomes of criminal trials in civil-law jurisdictions.

Our research aims at expanding this limited area of research. It tackles the question of how criminal courts use information about defendants' brains to adjudicate one of the gravest criminal offenses---homicide. This study is important for a number of reasons. First, it sheds more light on the use of neuroscience in a typical continental criminal justice system, where such research is very scarce. Second, it is specific as it focuses on a particular type of criminal offense, namely homicide. Third, and most importantly, this study is unique as it overcomes the common methodological drawback of the aforementioned studies regarding the sampling of cases and consequently issues with the generalization of the results. By taking advantage of Slovenia\'s small population of only two million citizens, we could analyse the entire available statistical population of criminal cases for the selected criminal offense in this country within a relatively long period. This allowed us to collect valid and reliable data and answer a number of vital questions about the use of neuroscience in Slovenian criminal courts.

In the following sections of this paper, first, the background and methodology of our study will be explained. Next, in the main part of the article, results on various aspects of the use of neuroscience in Slovenian homicide trials will be presented and commented on. Here we explore the prevalence of neuro-evidence, types of defendants' neurological conditions, and the impact of this evidence on judicial decisions. We pay particular attention to the impact of neuro-evidence on the outcomes of trials, criminal sanctions, and legal decision-making mechanisms through which judges make these decisions. In relation to these questions, the double-edged sword effect of neuroscience is called into question. Furthermore, we discuss the limitations of neuro-evidence in solving particular legal dilemmas, as observed in the analysed cases, as well as its persuasiveness with the decision-makers. The article concludes by emphasizing the most salient findings of the presented study and with suggestions for further research to better elucidate on the role of neuroscience in criminal courts around the world.

II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY {#sec2}
===========================================

The presented study analysed all available judgments in Slovenia, gathered from all Slovenian district courts, pertaining to completed or attempted homicides[^13^](#fn13){ref-type="fn"} that became final between 1991 and 2015. In total, 495 murder and manslaughter cases were reviewed. We focused on homicides for two main reasons. First, preliminary research through the Slovenian online database of appellate courts and the Supreme Court judgments[^14^](#fn14){ref-type="fn"} suggested that neuro-evidence is more prevalent in homicide cases compared to other types of criminal acts. The second reason was that the number of homicide trials in Slovenia is relatively low,[^15^](#fn15){ref-type="fn"} on the one hand, rendering a systematic analysis of the entire population of cases feasible. On the other hand, the number is still high enough for results to be statistically relevant.

Under Slovenian criminal law, all charges for murder or manslaughter are tried at first instance at district courts. Typically, murder and manslaughter trials are heard by a panel of two professional and three lay judges (jurors)[^16^](#fn16){ref-type="fn"} at district courts.[^17^](#fn17){ref-type="fn"} The presiding judge is always a professional judge. She is responsible for most of the procedural decisions before and during a trial and for writing a judgment after a trial. Apart from that, professional judges and jurors have equal rights when deliberating and voting on the defendant\'s guilt, criminal sanction, and related substantive as well as more important procedural decisions (see also *infra* Section [III](#sec3){ref-type="sec"}.G).[^18^](#fn18){ref-type="fn"}

Upon request for research purposes, we obtained copies of homicide case files directly from all the 11 Slovenian district courts. All written judgments issued in particular relevant cases that the courts were able to provide were included in the analysis. This means that the study did not only focus on judgments delivered by the first instance courts (district courts) but, when issued, also on appellate courts' (higher courts') and the Supreme Court\'s decisions.[^19^](#fn19){ref-type="fn"} As all homicide judgments were written and fully substantiated, this allowed us to get a complete and relatively clear picture about the use of neuroscience and its impact in the analysed cases.

By including the whole statistical population of tried homicide cases[^20^](#fn20){ref-type="fn"} in the reviewed 25 year period in the analysis, this study avoids the problem of sampling and generalization of results. The previous empirical studies all used publicly available databases in their respective countries to analyse court opinions. These databases are comprised differently in each country, but, as revealed by the authors of the studies, none of the databases holds a representative sample of cases,[^21^](#fn21){ref-type="fn"} making the generalization of results problematic. To the author\'s knowledge, hence, our study is the first neuroscience-oriented research systematically analysing all tried cases of a particular crime in a particular country in an extensive time frame.

One of the critical points at the very outset of this research (and other similar studies) was the definition of neuro-evidence. This problem is inseparably connected to the broader issue of a definition of neuroscience itself. There seems to be no universal definition of neuroscience in the literature despite a broad consensus that this field combines many different disciplines all placing the brain and the nervous system in the center of their research.[^22^](#fn22){ref-type="fn"} This study tried to avoid the pitfall of defining neuroscience evidence too broadly and chose narrower selection criteria, comparable to the studies cited above.[^23^](#fn23){ref-type="fn"} Cases were coded as involving neuroscience evidence if conditions such as the following were discussed at court: brain damage, neurological diseases and dysfunctions, *organic* mental disorders, *organic* personality, and behavioral disorders and the like. On the contrary, personality and mental disorders without a (specified) *organic* cause as well as drug and alcohol addictions not resulting in any established brain damage were not defined as relating to neuroscience in this study.[^24^](#fn24){ref-type="fn"} Nor did we code cases as neuroscience-related if a defendant was tried for (an attempt of) homicide allegedly committed under the influence of alcohol and/or psychoactive drugs.

The effect of neuro-evidence on judicial decisions was assessed by analysing judges' written reasoning for particular courts' decisions. If a judge backed a court\'s decision by mentioning neuro-evidence, we coded this as affecting a concrete decision.[^25^](#fn25){ref-type="fn"} We are aware of the limitations of such an approach. On one hand, it is possible that in some cases neuro-evidence implicitly influenced judges' decision-making without them explicitly mentioning it (or even being aware of its implicit influence), hence producing a false-negative in our study. On the other hand, an opposite scenario is possible as well where a false-positive occurs. Some decision-makers may have bolstered their arguments with information provided by neuroscience (eg among mitigating factors in sentencing), but, in fact, they did not ascribe any weight to it. Despite these potential drawbacks, we believe that the selected method is still the most valid empirical approach in a rational discourse that is judicial decision-making and the only one we can objectively defend.

The following methodological steps were taken in this study. Based on the targeted research questions, the author of the article first drafted an online questionnaire to guide coders in their ratings.[^26^](#fn26){ref-type="fn"} To avoid ambiguity and enhance reliability of the data analysis, most questions were closed-ended, sometimes with a semi-open option 'other' added to the closed-ended list of answers. There was only one completely open-ended question---regarding the neurological condition, brain damage, or other diagnosis that neuro-evidence referred to[^27^](#fn27){ref-type="fn"} (see Appendix for the English translation of the entire questionnaire used for this study).

Ten coders with knowledge of criminal law were selected for coding the decisions.[^28^](#fn28){ref-type="fn"} To strengthen interrater reliability, all the coders underwent a training and were subsequently tested. At the training, all the questions from the questionnaire were presented and detailed instructions on coding were given both in oral and written forms.[^29^](#fn29){ref-type="fn"} After the training, all coders were tested independently with the same two cases. Later, a second session with the coders was held where results of the test cases ratings were evaluated and inconsistencies between the coders' answers scrutinized and resolved. After the second session, the coders were given a third same test case to code it individually. Upon examining the results of the third test case, the author of the study found no inconsistencies between the coders' answers and was satisfied that coding could begin.[^30^](#fn30){ref-type="fn"} To maintain interrater consistency throughout the coding process, an online platform was established, resembling an FAQ database, for all the coders to refer to. On the online platform, the coders posed questions on concrete dilemmas and problems they encountered in the coding process and the author of the study promptly provided answers.

When the coding process was concluded, the author reviewed results for all 495 cases. In a few cases where there were indications that neuroscience-related evidence might have been either missed or its impact miscoded by a coder, the author directly accessed judicial decisions and reviewed the results.[^31^](#fn31){ref-type="fn"} In the last phase, the author of the study conducted analysis of the gathered data.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION {#sec3}
===========================

III.A. General Findings {#sec3-1}
-----------------------

Out of 495 cases, as many as 89 cases (18%) discussed neuro-evidence. As some studies use wider criteria to define neuroscience, further assessments were made regarding other brain-related conditions. If we add to our selection criteria cases in which a defendant was under the influence of alcohol and/or psychoactive drugs, the share of cases amounts to 34% (169 cases). Furthermore, if we add procedures with an established defendant\'s personality or mental disorder *without* identified organic or neurological etiology, the share of such cases represents 45% (221 cases) of all analysed case files. Nonetheless, the following analysis will concentrate on the 89 cases with the most narrowly defined selection criteria.

These results show that almost every fifth homicide trial in Slovenia refers to neuro-evidence. Prior to the research, we did not expect such a large share of trials discussing neurological conditions. Even less so, as the analysed cases reach back to the beginning of 1990s. It has been suggested by some authors that there was little use of neuroscience in criminal courts in that period.[^32^](#fn32){ref-type="fn"} Unfortunately, there are almost no empirical data in the literature for a comparison of our results. Farahany\'s conservative assessment is that neurobiological evidence is introduced in 5--6% of murder trials in the USA.[^33^](#fn33){ref-type="fn"} If this is accurate, our data demonstrate that in Slovenia neuro-evidence is at least three times more prevalent in homicide trials when compared to the USA.

It is important to note that in almost all of the reviewed cases neuro-evidence was delivered or commented on by a court-appointed expert. In only four cases, did the court not appoint an expert to assess the defendant\'s alleged brain damage as his assertions were *prima facie* unsubstantiated or not relevant for the trial. In the Slovenian criminal procedure, a court-sworn expert witness delivering a formal expert opinion can only be appointed by the court, whereas opinions provided by a party hiring an expert do not have a status of an expert opinion. Therefore, the parties can only propose to the court to appoint an expert witness and, at most, support that motion with a privately obtained expert opinion.[^34^](#fn34){ref-type="fn"} However, the decision whether to appoint an expert witness or not is solely at the discretion of the court. The fact that an expert witness was appointed in more than 95% of the trials where potential neurological conditions were mentioned indicates that the Slovenian criminal courts are very cautious and thorough when examining neuroscience-based arguments in homicide trials.

Another interesting general finding is that we did not encounter any substantial increase in the use of neuro-evidence in homicide trials. The absolute number of such cases varied significantly over the years, but, as demonstrated in Graph [1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}, the linear regression line remains almost horizontal. Nonetheless, if we look at the percentage of neuro-cases per year, we see that there is a slight but evident trend of increased share of decisions discussing neuro-evidence in the observed 15 year period (see Graph [2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"}). This finding is intriguing in light of all the other comparable empirical studies showing the number of criminal cases discussing neuro-evidence has been rapidly increasing in other countries,[^35^](#fn35){ref-type="fn"} with a potential exception in the Netherlands, where this trend is not conclusive.[^36^](#fn36){ref-type="fn"} We hypothesize that a less discernible trend in our study, as well as a very high number of neuroscience-related expert opinions, can be attributed to the strong inquisitorial elements of the Slovenian criminal procedure, on the one hand, and the gravity of the analysed criminal offenses, on the other hand. Following the inquisitorial, truth-finding principle '\[t\]he presiding judge has to ensure that a case is elucidated in all its aspects and that the truth is discovered'.[^37^](#fn37){ref-type="fn"} In other words, '\[t\]he court has a duty to discover the truth which makes it responsible for the outcome of the case.'[^38^](#fn38){ref-type="fn"}
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Therefore, in our cases, the presiding judge was equally interested in possible neurological conditions relevant to the pending case as were the parties. Moreover, murders and manslaughters are one of the most serious criminal offenses and occur relatively rarely in Slovenia.[^39^](#fn39){ref-type="fn"} Hence, these trials draw much public attention and are more likely to be subject to an appeal and to come under the scrutiny of higher courts and the Supreme Court.[^40^](#fn40){ref-type="fn"} Due to the severity of the prescribed criminal sanctions, defense teams typically invoke all possible mitigating factors---including those in the defendant\'s brain. Similarly, courts want to explore these allegations with expert witnesses not to miss potential legally relevant information. Thus, it is possible that we would find a different trend if we looked at less serious and more common criminal offenses. Nonetheless, preliminary research through an (unrepresentative) Slovenian online database of judicial decisions[^41^](#fn41){ref-type="fn"} suggested that Slovenian courts are very susceptible to neuro-evidence even when trying petty crimes.[^42^](#fn42){ref-type="fn"}

III.A.1. Experts, Methods, and Diagnoses {#sec3-2}
----------------------------------------

By reviewing judgments, much can be discovered about the background of neuroscience experts, the methods they used, as well as neurological conditions, damage, and disorders that the experts diagnosed. Unfortunately, we did not have direct access to written expert opinions themselves, but to judgments summarizing them. The writing styles of judges substantiating courts' decisions vary. Some are very thorough and comprehensive in summarizing expert witnesses' opinions, whereas others only briefly outline experts' main points. In the latter cases, some information is inevitably lost.

Thus, the profile of an expert witness is not always evident from the judgment. When stated, the specialization of an expert giving an opinion about a defendant\'s brain is by far most frequently psychiatry or neuropsychiatry. There were only four appointed neurologists and four cases with a team of experts from different backgrounds as well as a couple of individual cases with expert witnesses described as epilepsy specialists and radiologists. It needs to be emphasized that courts regularly appoint (neuro)psychiatrists as expert witnesses due to a provision in the Slovenian Criminal Procedure Act (hereinafter CPA) specifically providing for a psychiatrist as an expert witness in all questions regarding insanity, diminished capacity, or fitness for trial.[^43^](#fn43){ref-type="fn"} However, it is often evident from a (neuro)psychiatrist\'s expert opinion that she either consulted other neuroscience experts, obtained results of specific tests (eg neuropsychological testing, electroencephalography \[EEG\]) from them, or even specifically requested from the court to obtain another complementary opinion from a particular expert area.

Specific mentioning of the methods used by the experts examining defendants and their brains is relatively rare in the judgments. Typically, a standard formulation reads that the expert examined, tested, and interviewed the defendant and examined his available medical documentation. Nevertheless, we encountered four cases explicitly mentioning structural brain imaging, five cases of EEG tests, and 12 cases of neuropsychological testing. There was no recorded functional neuroimaging among the reviewed cases, which is congruent with findings in other countries, suggesting that functional brain imaging is still a rather exceptional evidentiary method.[^44^](#fn44){ref-type="fn"}

Neurological conditions and their causes discussed in the Slovenian homicide judgments are most diverse. We divided them into five broad categories (see Table [1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}). Two equally large groups (25 cases each) are most prevalent: traumatic brain injury and brain damage due to long-term drug and/or alcohol abuse. There are seven cases of age-related neurological conditions (eg vascular dementia) and a substantial group of miscellaneous conditions ranging from epilepsy, multi-infarct dementia to known side-effects of a liver medication affecting an entire nervous system. In a large group of cases, the summarized description is too general for a proper analysis, eg, 'mild brain impairment', 'organic brain damage', or 'psycho-organic syndrome'. More than occasionally, conditions overlap. For example, some defendants suffered a traumatic brain injury in addition to brain damage caused by long-term alcohol abuse.

###### 

Diagnoses discussed in homicide judgments.

  Nature and causes of neurological conditions     No. of cases (N = 85)   Share of cases
  ----------------------------------------------- ----------------------- ----------------
  Traumatic brain injury                                    25                  29%
  Brain damage due to alcohol and/or drug abuse             25                  29%
  Age-related impairments                                    7                   8%
  Other specified                                           17                  20%
  Unspecified                                               24                  28%

Categories are not mutually exclusive, as some conditions overlap.

III.B. The Impact of Neuro-Evidence on Judicial Decisions {#sec3-3}
---------------------------------------------------------

The essential questions in our research are whether, in what way, and to what extent neuro-evidence influenced judicial decisions in the analysed homicide trials. We expected to find some impact on judicial decisions, but the scale of the effect is well above our expectations. We discovered that the introduced neuro-evidence affected judicial decisions in 85% of criminal trials (72 out of 85 cases). In a broader perspective, neuro-evidence influenced judicial decisions in 15% of all homicide trials in Slovenia in the analysed 25 year period (72 out of 495 cases). There were only 13 trials where neuro-evidence was introduced and mentioned by the trial court but had no clear effect on any judicial decision (see Table [2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"}).

###### 

Effect of neuro-evidence on judicial decisions.

  Effect of neuro-evidence on judicial decisions   No. of cases (N = 85)   Share of cases                                 
  ------------------------------------------------ ----------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----- -----------------------------------------
  Insanity                                         11                      71[^\*^](#tb2fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}   13%   84%[^\*^](#tb2fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Substantially diminished capacity                49                                                               58%   
  Diminished capacity                              4                                                                5%    
  Excludes insanity/diminished capacity            7                                                                8%    
  Criminal sanction                                55                      65%                                            
  Unfit for trial                                  2                       2%                                             
  Disproves defendant\'s claims                    2                       2%                                             
  No effect                                        13                      15%                                            

The categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, the majority of decisions regarding insanity, substantially diminished capacity, and diminished capacity also affected criminal sanction decisions.

^\*^All criminal capacity decisions.

###### 

Effects of neuro-evidence on criminal sanctions.

  Effect of neuro-evidence on criminal sanction                               No. of cases (N = 85)   Share of cases
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------- ----------------
  Mitigating circumstances                                                             35                  41%
  Reduction of sentence                                                                16                  19%
  Aggravating circumstances                                                             0                   0%
  Acquittal                                                                             2                   2%
  Termination of procedure                                                              2                   2%
  Compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution             18                  21%
  Compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty                                           3                   4%
  No effect                                                                            18                  21%

Categories are not mutually exclusive; eg both types of compulsory psychiatric treatment can be combined with mitigating circumstances or reduced sentence.

Neuro-evidence\'s effect is most evident in criminal sanctions. We identified 55 cases (65%) where neuro-evidence played a role in courts' sanctioning decisions. However, neuro-evidence rarely directly influenced a court\'s decision on a sanction. Typically, it affected the criminal sanction through a decision regarding the defendant\'s criminal capacity, which, in turn, reflected in a lower sentence or another type of a sanction (see Sections III.C and III.D *infra*). In fact, taken together, decisions concerning criminal capacity are the largest category of judicial decisions affected by neuro-evidence (71 cases, 84%).[^45^](#fn45){ref-type="fn"} There were 49 cases (58%) where a conclusion about a defendant\'s substantially diminished capacity was made based on neuro-evidence,[^46^](#fn46){ref-type="fn"} 11 cases (13%) where the defendant was declared insane, and four cases where only diminished capacity (but not substantially) was established. We also encountered seven cases where the defense claimed that the defendant was insane or that he acted with a substantially diminished capacity due to a brain dysfunction or disorder, but neuroscience testing disproved this claim.

There were only two cases where neuro-evidence contributed to a decision that the defendant was unfit for trial. In another two cases, neurological tests disproved the defendant\'s testimony. In one of these cases, the defendant claimed he suffered from amnesia caused by an alleged brain tumor, which was later not confirmed by brain imaging.[^47^](#fn47){ref-type="fn"} In another such case, it was established in the trial that the perpetrator had displaced the body of the victim by dragging it for some distance. The defendant claimed that he was not capable of such physical strain as he had severe epilepsy. An expert witness confirmed the defendant\'s condition but testified that this neurological disorder could not prevent him from dragging the victim\'s body.

III.C. The Impact of Neuro-Evidence on the Outcome of a Trial and the Criminal Sanction {#sec3-4}
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For every defendant, the outcome of the trial is of crucial importance. We can assume that a defendant cares much less about a theoretical distinction between substantially diminished capacity and diminished capacity as he/she does about the imposed criminal sanction. The same can be said for the general public, as, besides the gravity of criminal offense, the trial outcome is supposed to reflect the moral blame and criminal responsibility of the defendant. Hence, one of the pivotal research questions in this study is how neuro-evidence influenced the outcomes of homicide trials. However, as pointed out earlier, sanctioning in the Slovenian criminal justice system is inseparably connected to the defendant\'s criminal capacity, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Before discussing the impact of neuro-evidence on criminal sanctions and other trial outcomes, this connection needs to be briefly explained.

When a trial court or one of the parties questions the defendant\'s criminal capacity, the court would typically appoint a court-sworn expert witness to assess the defendant\'s psychological capabilities. Based on the expert witness\'s opinion, the court has to determine whether a defendant acted in a state of (a) insanity,[^48^](#fn48){ref-type="fn"} (b) substantially diminished capacity,[^49^](#fn49){ref-type="fn"} (c) diminished capacity, or (d) sanity. The court can determine criminal responsibility and pronounce an appropriate criminal sanction only after the criminal capacity has been established.[^50^](#fn50){ref-type="fn"}

If a defendant is found insane, he/she cannot be deemed criminally responsible for a criminal offence he/she committed. In this case, the court can either acquit him/her or order one of the medical security measures if statutory conditions are fulfilled (see Section III.D *infra*). In case a defendant committed a crime in a state of substantially diminished capacity, he/she is criminally responsible and can be convicted. However, a substantially diminished capacity can be considered either as a mitigating circumstance or an exceptionally mitigating circumstance, allowing the court to mitigate the sentence within statutory ranges or reduce it below the statutory minimum, respectively. In both these scenarios, the court can combine the sentence with any of the two psychiatric security measures.[^51^](#fn51){ref-type="fn"}

When insanity or substantially diminished capacity has not been established, the presumption is that the defendant is criminally sane. Nonetheless, in practice, it often turns out that a defendant committed a crime in the state of a somewhat diminished capacity (but not substantially). In these cases, a court cannot order any of the security measures and cannot use this fact as a basis for a reduction of sentence. It can, however, mitigate the sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits if it finds this circumstance relevant.

Our results show that neuro-evidence had an actual effect on the outcome of a trial in almost 80% of trials where such evidence was admitted (67 out of 85 cases). Most frequently, in 35 cases (41%), it contributed to establishing mitigating circumstances. This means that courts used this information to mitigate the prison sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits. Furthermore, we found as many as 16 cases (19%) where neuro-evidence was the basis for a reduction of a prison sentence even below the statutorily prescribed minimum for murder or manslaughter (see Table [3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"}).

The court can reduce a sentence when a defendant is found to be of substantially diminished capacity during the execution of a crime or when exceptional mitigating circumstances exist. In the Slovenian criminal justice system, '\[m\]itigating and aggravating circumstances are constructed as a rather broad and loose category, which is clearly intended to allow sufficient room for individualization \[of sentence\]'.[^52^](#fn52){ref-type="fn"} It is for the court to establish in every single case whether and which mitigating or exceptional mitigating circumstances exist and whether provisions regarding mitigation or reduction of sentence should be applied. There is no *numerus clausus* of such circumstances; CC only lists a number of typical aggravating and mitigating circumstances as examples.[^53^](#fn53){ref-type="fn"}

Taking into account these provisions, our results are significant as they reveal the weight that courts attributed to defendants' neurological conditions even without an explicit statutory prescription. Our study indicates that courts typically interpreted brain conditions of criminally responsible perpetrators as relevant to the extent that mitigation and even reduction of sentence were necessary.

On the other hand, we did not find a single case where the information about a defendant\'s brain would be interpreted as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, due to neuro-evidence, courts acquitted two defendants.[^54^](#fn54){ref-type="fn"} In both these trials, the defendants were found insane, but conditions for security measures (compulsory psychiatric treatment, see Section III.D *infra*) were not fulfilled. In another two cases, the procedure was terminated because the defendants were found permanently unfit for trial.

III.D. The Elusive Concept of the Double-Edged Sword of Neuroscience {#sec3-5}
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Read together, the presented data suggest that in 65% of all cases with the introduced neuro-evidence the outcomes were favorable for the defendants while at the same time this defense strategy never backfired.[^55^](#fn55){ref-type="fn"} In other words, these findings demonstrate that there is no evidence of the double-edged sword of neuroscience effect among Slovenian homicide cases.[^56^](#fn56){ref-type="fn"}

While this is undoubtedly true for prison sentences alone, one should be very careful in drawing the same conclusion for all criminal sanctions as among them security measures play an important role as well. The Slovenian criminal justice system knows two types of medical security measures: (a) compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution, and (b) compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty. The difference between the two types of compulsory psychiatric treatment is that with the second one a defendant is not confined to a psychiatric hospital but is free to reside at home. He is obliged, nonetheless, to attend and participate in the prescribed treatment program. If a defendant committed a crime in a state of insanity, he could not be convicted, but the court can order any of the two security measures if conditions provided in CC are met.

To order compulsory psychiatric treatment, the court must be convinced that there is a real danger that a defendant might commit another serious crime due to his/her mental disorder and that this danger can be remedied with one of the medical security measures. Similarly, the court can order any of the two measures under the same conditions when a defendant committed a crime in a state of substantially diminished capacity. However, in these situations, the defendant is considered criminally responsible, and a sentence can be passed together with a security measure. A potential prison sentence is then carried out after a psychiatric treatment is concluded.

Among the analysed neuroscience-related cases, there were 21 homicide trials (25%) that ended with a court ordering compulsory psychiatric treatment: either at liberty (in three cases, 4%) or, more typically, with confinement in a health institution (18 cases, 21%). In Slovenia, the latter security measure can be imposed as a criminal sanction for a maximum duration of five years. The court has to assess every six months if such a security measure is still necessary. After five years, compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution can no longer be extended as a criminal sanction.[^57^](#fn57){ref-type="fn"} Thereafter, the person should be either released or referred to other treatment programs. However, a decision whether the person in question should be subjected to a similar involuntary treatment and confinement in a health institution is in the exclusive jurisdiction of specialized civil courts.[^58^](#fn58){ref-type="fn"}

It could hardly be argued that compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty is a harsh sanction for a perpetrator of (an attempted) murder or manslaughter. Contrary, however, compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution could easily be compared to a prison sentence as it entails deprivation of liberty and often deeply intrusive interventions into one\'s fundamental human rights.[^59^](#fn59){ref-type="fn"} Thus, one could assume that in 21% of the homicide trials where neuro-evidence was introduced, this contributed to decisions that had similarly adverse consequences for the defendants as a prison sentence would. In our opinion, however, such a conclusion would not be accurate. It needs to be emphasized that the objective of compulsory psychiatric treatment is not to punish the perpetrator but to protect society from the perpetrator and/or the perpetrator from himself or herself. Moreover, such treatment programs in forensic units of psychiatric hospitals are rehabilitation-oriented in practice.[^60^](#fn60){ref-type="fn"}

While in all the 25% of the discussed cases neuro-evidence was indeed used to establish the neurological roots of the defendant\'s potential dangerousness, this information was never used in the same way as observers of the double-edged sword effect report for other countries, ie, supporting a case for the defendant\'s incapacitation and (permanent) removal and isolation from the society.[^61^](#fn61){ref-type="fn"} In Slovenian criminal courts, neuro-evidence was used to build an entirely different type of arguments. First, as emphasized above, this information was never used as an argument for a harsher or longer sentence. Second, neither the prosecution nor the court ever suggested that the perpetrator should be permanently removed from the society as his/her brain would be 'beyond repair' and he/she would represent a constant threat to the society.[^62^](#fn62){ref-type="fn"} Therefore, it could be maintained that courts never presumed in advance that the defendant\'s dangerous behavior rooting in his neurological condition could not be changed. In other words, it seems that the criminal justice system never gave up---at least expressly---on the idea of rehabilitation even for the perpetrators of most severe crimes. The attitude of the Slovenian criminal justice system towards perpetrators of homicides with brain dysfunctions could perhaps be characterized as optimistic, idealistic, or paternalistic, but hardly as solely incapacitating. Even if this interpretation is not valid in all cases, the results of our study nonetheless indicate that the general discourse on the double-edged sword of neuroscience may be overly simplified. The information brought into criminal trials by neuro-evidence is versatile and interpretatively open. Our findings show that courts indeed use this information in various judicial decisions that can hardly be reduced to two dimensions only---either benefiting or harming the defendant. The use of (rehabilitative) medical security measures is one such decision that arguably combines both adverse but, in principle, ultimately favorable measures for the defendant.

Why did our study not find confirmation for the double-edged sword effect and why did the very concept itself prove to be rather elusive? A comprehensive answer to this question is complex and beyond the scope of this article. In our opinion, it is, however, strongly connected to at least two general factors that should be briefly mentioned. First, we believe that the explanation is related to a broader legal tradition shaping judicial decision-making in every country. We concur with Shen 'that most of the variation in the introduction of neuroscientific evidence is a product of each country\'s unique legal, historical, and sociocultural context'.[^63^](#fn63){ref-type="fn"} The Slovenian criminal justice system has always belonged to the continental legal tradition.[^64^](#fn64){ref-type="fn"} It appears that rehabilitation and a milder punitive response by the state have strongly signified continental legal cultures compared to more punitive attitudes in Anglo-Saxon legal traditions.[^65^](#fn65){ref-type="fn"} As acknowledged by Tonry: 'Although it is not at all clear what it is about Anglo-Saxon culture that makes predominantly English-speaking countries especially punitive, they are'.[^66^](#fn66){ref-type="fn"}

Some evidence in the field of law and neuroscience research has already supported the hypothesis that different legal traditions utilize similar evidence differently. A study by Aspinwall et al.[^67^](#fn67){ref-type="fn"} on the influence of the presented convict\'s neuro-genetic explanation of psychopathy is one such example. This study yielded very different results with US state judges compared to a later one replicated with German judges.[^68^](#fn68){ref-type="fn"} While American judges in the study could not opt for rehabilitation, the presented neuro-genetic explanation increased their mentioning of both mitigating and aggravating factors. In Germany, on the other hand, one of the most salient results was that 'neurogenetic arguments presented by the prosecution significantly increased the number of judges (23% compared with 6%) ordering an involuntary commitment in a forensic psychiatric hospital'.[^69^](#fn69){ref-type="fn"} These results seem consistent with our findings that 25% of trials with presented neuro-evidence end with an ordered psychiatric security measure.

Further explanation why the results of our homicide study do not fit the concept of the double-edged sword of neuroscience may be found in the specific Slovenian criminal-justice policy model sometimes termed Slovenian exceptionalism.[^70^](#fn70){ref-type="fn"} It is marked by low crime and imprisonment rates,[^71^](#fn71){ref-type="fn"} a relatively lenient punitive response to crime by the state, and the endorsement of rehabilitative correctional practices.[^72^](#fn72){ref-type="fn"} A strong emphasis on the mitigating and rehabilitative use of neuro-evidence revealed by our study may reflect this general Slovenian criminal-justice orientation.

III.E. How Neuro-Evidence Shaped Judicial Decisions {#sec3-6}
---------------------------------------------------

Apparently, the sword of neuroscience does not swing in two directions only, and it is indeed a much more sophisticated tool. One of the most notable findings of this study is that neuro-evidence in Slovenia influences sentencing decisions indirectly. While scholars in common-law countries observed that the impact of neuroscience is most salient in the last phase of the criminal trial---the sentencing phase,[^73^](#fn73){ref-type="fn"} our study shows that the mechanism in Slovenian trials is different. The critical role of neuro-evidence appears as early as in the stage of establishing criminal capacity. Information about the defendant\'s brain presented in this phase subsequently reflects in establishing an appropriate criminal sanction. From that perspective, the role of neuro-evidence appears more prominent in the Slovenian criminal justice system than in common-law systems. It is interesting to note that Dutch authors observed a similar pattern when examining the role of neuroscience in criminal courts in the Netherlands.[^74^](#fn74){ref-type="fn"}

These similarities between the two continental criminal-law systems suggest that neuro-evidence affects judicial decision-making in continental criminal-law models differently from that in common-law countries. While neuro-evidence affects sanctioning in both legal traditions, it does so in continental systems by informing courts about the questions of criminal capacity (responsibility) first. This information then reflects in sanctioning decisions. In common-law systems, on the other hand, the impact of neuro-evidence in establishing criminal capacity appears weaker. There, neuro-evidence plays a more important role in the sanctioning phase of the trial independently. Nonetheless, more empirical evidence from countries belonging to both criminal-law families is needed to test this hypothesis.

III.F. The Blunt Sword of Neuroscience {#sec3-7}
--------------------------------------

Notwithstanding the debate about the plurality of edges attributed to the sword of neuroscience, it turned out in our study that confronted with a particular type of a Gordian knot, this sword appears rather blunt. The Gordian knot in question is a distinction between normative levels of criminal capacity, in practice, most notably between insanity and substantially diminished capacity. The analysed homicide cases showed that courts often consult a neuroscience expert witness when dilemmas about the defendant\'s mental state *tempore criminis* emerge. A court typically formulates a standard question for an expert witness ordering him/her to assess the defendant\'s ability to understand the meaning of his/her act and his/her ability to control his conduct. When examining these questions, expert witnesses often encounter brain damage, neurological impairments, and dysfunctions that have likely affected the defendant\'s mental capabilities. Our study revealed that neuro-evidence frequently provided invaluable information on neurological causes of mental and psychiatric conditions. However, it proved out to be much less useful for courts' normative decisions about whether the severity of these dysfunctions translated into the legal category of insanity or (substantially) diminished capacity. It was evident in a number of cases that courts sought and expected more information from neuroscience experts on the question of how a particular brain dysfunction affected the defendant\'s concrete mental and cognitive capacities. Neuroscience experts, however, were seldom able to provide such a definitive answer that could be simply subsumed under one of the categories. The following case nicely illustrates this issue.

A defendant, an elderly man, was tried for two attempts of manslaughter. In a bizarre series of events, the defendant got up very early in the morning and, unprovoked, attacked his sleeping wife and daughter with an axe. Both victims survived the attack as subsequently a neighbor interfered and disabled the defendant. An expert witness, a psychiatrist, was appointed to examine the defendant and to give his opinion on the defendant\'s mental state. Based on MRI brain scans, reports of a clinical psychologist, and his own examinations, the expert witness concluded that the defendant suffered from cerebral atrophy, multi-stroke dementia, organic personality disorder, and was very likely in a delirium when he committed the two criminal acts due to temporarily severely decreased cerebral blood flow. Hence, the expert witness estimated that the defendant\'s mental state corresponded to at least substantially diminished capacity, but more likely to insanity. However, even after the court\'s specific inquiry into which of the two categories would best fit the defendant\'s mental state, the expert witness could not give a definite answer. The court thus appointed another expert witness to re-examine the defendant and to re-evaluate gathered medical evidence. The second expert interpreted neuro-evidence differently and concluded that the defendant\'s psychological picture *tempore criminis* better fitted substantially diminished capacity than insanity. It is intriguing, however, that the second expert did not back his argument with neuroscience evidence, but rather with his common-sense perception of the defendant\'s behavior.

This case is illustrative in many ways, but at least two points seem particularly salient. They demonstrate that problems that many legal scholars have recognized in theory indeed pose great challenges in practice as well. The first one is that neuro-evidence is typically interpretatively very open. This finding is not new; many scholars writing on law and neuroscience have pointed it out and warned about the ambiguity of neuroscience-based evidence.[^75^](#fn75){ref-type="fn"} The second point exemplified by this case is that neuro-evidence can help with but cannot substitute courts' inherently normative decisions such as criminal responsibility and the level of criminal capacity.[^76^](#fn76){ref-type="fn"} The presented case (and some others in this study) demonstrated very clearly that the established facts of the case never perfectly fitted into legal categories. Neuroscience-based expert testimony may provide sufficient factual grounds for the court to base its decision upon it. Ultimately, however, it is the court\'s responsibility and obligation to make normative judgments. The sword of neuroscience itself, however skillfully wielded, can never make a clean cut between distinct legal categories such as insanity and substantially diminished capacity.

III.G. Persuasiveness of Neuro-Evidence {#sec3-8}
---------------------------------------

There is a considerable body of research looking into the persuasiveness of neuroscientific explanations of human behavior.[^77^](#fn77){ref-type="fn"} This has induced further research on the persuasiveness of neuro-evidence in criminal trials. Most of these studies employ mock jurors adjudicating hypothetical criminal cases,[^78^](#fn78){ref-type="fn"} while there is extremely limited research exploring the effectiveness of such evidence on professional legal decision-makers.[^79^](#fn79){ref-type="fn"} Although there is no full consensus on the matter, results seem to suggest that neuro-evidence is indeed more persuasive compared to other types of related expert evidence (eg psychological expert opinions). However, neuroimaging evidence, in particular, does not appear to be more convincing than other types of neuro-evidence.[^80^](#fn80){ref-type="fn"}

The question that seems to remain unresolved is whether professional judges differ from lay decision-makers in their susceptibility to neuroscientific explanations of criminal behavior. From the perspective of this research question, the composition of panels of judges adjudicating homicide cases in Slovenia is particularly interesting. As explained *supra* (see Section [II](#sec2){ref-type="sec"}), homicide cases in Slovenia are normally tried by a panel of two professional judges and three jurors. According to the CPA, jurors and professional judges on the panel have equal rights in deliberating and voting on the outcome of the trial. Unfortunately, there is no research on the actual influence of lay judges on trial decisions in Slovenia. To a large extent this is due to the statutory provisions explicitly providing for the confidentiality of the deliberating and voting process.[^81^](#fn81){ref-type="fn"} Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests different dynamics in decision-making within a panel of judges. These range from observations that lay judges only passively follow the decisions of professional judges to reports of lay judges' strong influence on pivotal trial decisions, particularly on sentencing. There are even occasional accounts of lay judges outvoting their professional counterparts in certain decisions.[^82^](#fn82){ref-type="fn"}

It is our hypothesis, however, that legal background of decision-makers should be of little or no importance for the persuasiveness of neuro-evidence in court. It seems more plausible that a background in neuroscience or related areas is a far more decisive factor in these situations. This has already been suggested outside the legal context.[^83^](#fn83){ref-type="fn"} Unfortunately, the design of our study prevents us from testing this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the fact that neuro-evidence did have a very strong effect on judicial decisions reached by mixed panels of professional and lay judges strongly supports the proposition that professional and lay judges are similarly susceptible to neuro-evidence.

III.H. Generalization {#sec3-9}
---------------------

Our study is unprecedented as it systematically searched and analysed neuroscience-related cases in all available murder and manslaughter criminal procedures in a particular country for a period of over two and a half decades. Nevertheless, the specificity of homicides urges caution in generalizing the results of this study, especially those concerning the prevalence of neuro-evidence, to other types of criminal offenses. In homicide trials, the stakes are high for all the actors involved. Moreover, these trials are usually under the thorough scrutiny of the public and later by higher judicial instances. Therefore, parties, courts, and expert witnesses typically do not hesitate to investigate every potentially relevant fact, which often results in also examining the defendant\'s brain.

Notwithstanding that caveat, preliminary exploratory research through the publically available online database of judicial decisions by Slovenian higher (appellate) courts and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia[^84^](#fn84){ref-type="fn"} signaled that neuro-evidence is indeed used in most diverse types of criminal offenses ranging from arson to traffic offenses. Moreover, we even found a significant number of misdemeanor cases in which courts discussed neuro-evidence.[^85^](#fn85){ref-type="fn"} These data imply that Slovenian courts do not consult neuro-evidence only when dealing with most severe types of crime but in all types and categories of criminal offenses, even when trying petty crimes. However, further empirical research would better clarify to what extent the results of this homicide study can be generalized to other types of crime in Slovenia.

IV. CONCLUSION {#sec4}
==============

The presented study attests to a wide prevalence and a strong influence of neuro-evidence in murder and manslaughter trials in Slovenia. Not only did our research reveal that neuro-evidence is frequently discussed in homicide trials (almost at every fifth trial), but also that it strongly leverages courts' judicial decisions. Altogether, neuro-evidence left a concrete impact on as many as 15% of all homicide trials in the past 25 years. Evidence about defendants' brains most commonly informed decision-makers on questions of criminal capacity, ie (in)sanity and (substantially) diminished capacity. This information subsequently affected courts' sanctioning decisions, bolstering decisions both on reduced and mitigated prison sentences and on ordered medical security measures (involuntary psychiatric treatment). In light of similar findings in the Netherlands,[^86^](#fn86){ref-type="fn"} the identified impact mechanism concerning criminal sanctions suggests a different pattern in neuroscience-influenced decision-making in continental criminal-law systems from that in common-law legal traditions. In the latter systems, the information on the defendant\'s brain abnormalities typically comes into play in sentencing decisions independently.

This is not the only difference likely exposing the gap in the interpretation of neuro-evidence between different legal cultures. Another one implies a greater complexity of the existing double-edged sword dilemma. The ambiguity of the data about defendants' brains renders judicial utilization of this evidence extremely versatile, eluding the simple divide between neuro-evidence having either positive or negative effect for the defendant. Even though neuro-evidence was never interpreted as an aggravating factor in the analysed homicide cases, it often contributed decisively to a court\'s decision for involuntary psychiatric treatment, a decision that has arguably both positive and negative repercussions for the defendant. Moreover, this research also revealed the inherent bluntness of the sword of neuroscience in cutting thorough ultimately normative questions, such as proclaiming the defendant as either insane or acting with substantially diminished capacity.

Our study shed light on the use of neuro-evidence in criminal procedures in a small Central European country with a typical continental criminal-law system and compared its findings to the existing research coming from much larger, mostly common-law, jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the relevance of its findings may extend well beyond the narrow territory where it was conducted. It acknowledges a number of similarities and points out many particularities in the way neuro-evidence is presented, understood, and used in criminal courts in Slovenia and elsewhere. Thus, this research demonstrates that defendants are indeed judged differently by their brains in different criminal justice systems. Further empirical research from more countries would help to paint a larger and more detailed picture about the use of neuroscience in criminal procedures around the world. Such a more comprehensive assessment of the present use of neuroscience needs to go hand in hand with currently far more evolved theoretical discussions in this field. Only by such approach may we thoroughly tackle a myriad of complex and ever more topical challenges stemming from the intersection of criminal law and neuroscience.
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Questionnaire[^87^](#fn87){ref-type="fn"} {#sec1as}
=========================================

-   • Name of the coder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Court number of the case: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Which district court dealt with the case?

    -   □ Ljubljana

    -   □ Maribor

    -   □ Celje

    -   □ Murska Sobota

    -   □ Ptuj

    -   □ Slovenj Gradec

    -   □ Kranj

    -   □ Novo mesto

    -   □ KrŠko

    -   □ Koper

    -   □ Nova Gorica

-   • Date of the district court decision: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Was there a retrial?

    -   □ No

    -   □ One

    -   □ Two

    -   □ Other\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Mental health of the defendant *\[more than one answer is possible\]:*

    -   □ no recorded problems

    -   □ mental disorders without prior treatment: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ mental disorders with prior treatment: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ established dissocial personality disorder

    -   □ established other personality disorder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Defendant\'s addiction before committing the offense (as is evident from the judgment):

    -   □ drugs

    -   □ alcohol

    -   □ gambling

    -   □ not reported

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Defendant\'s sanity *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ sane

    -   □ diminished sanity

    -   □ substantially diminished sanity

    -   □ insane

-   • The trial ends with:

    -   □ not guilty verdict

    -   □ guilty verdict

    -   □ ruling on ordering a security measure

    -   □ ruling on the termination of the procedure

    -   □ rejection of charges verdict

-   • Reason for not guilty verdict:

    -   □ self-defense

    -   □ necessity

    -   □ lack of evidence

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Reason for ruling on the termination of the procedure:

    -   □ the death of the defendant

    -   □ periods of prescription

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Criminal sanction *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ prison sentence

    -   □ suspended prison sentence

    -   □ security measure

    -   □ accessory sentence

    -   □ no sentence

-   • Prison sentence *\[insert number\]*:

    -   Prison sentence for homicide: No. of years: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_; No. of months: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_;

    -   Combined prison sentence: No. of years: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_; No. of months: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_;

-   • Suspended prison sentence *\[insert number\]*:

    -   Passed sentence for homicide: No. of years: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_; No. of months: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_;

    -   Term of suspension: No. of years: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_; No. of months: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_;

    -   Combined sentence: No. of years: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_; No. of months: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_;

    -   Combined term of suspension: No. of years: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_; No. of months: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_;

-   • Applied security measure *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution

    -   □ compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty

    -   □ barring from performing the occupation

    -   □ barring from approaching to and communicating with the victim

    -   □ revoking of driving license

    -   □ confiscation of objects,

    -   □ compulsory treatment of alcohol or drug addiction

-   • Accessory sentence *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ deportation of an alien

    -   □ fine

    -   □ revoking of driving license

-   • Reduction of sentence (below statutory minimum) because of *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ exceeded self-defense

    -   □ substantially diminished capacity

    -   □ mistake of law

    -   □ exceeded necessity

    -   □ attempt

    -   □ criminal support

    -   □ special circumstances

    -   □ plea bargain

    -   □ guilty plea at the first hearing

-   • Special circumstances causing a reduction of sentence below statutory minimum *\[more than one answer is possible\]:*

    -   □ attempt

    -   □ contribution of the victim immediately before the offence

    -   □ preexisting problematic relationship with the victim

    -   □ no criminal record

    -   □ youth/immaturity

    -   □ old age

    -   □ a parent of an unsupported child

    -   □ difficult conditions at the time of growing up

    -   □ orderly life conditions at the time of the trial (family, job, apartment)

    -   □ diminished capacity

    -   □ remoteness of time of the event

    -   □ forgiveness from the victim/victim\'s family

    -   □ guilty plea

    -   □ repentance/remorse

    -   □ apology

    -   □ restitution for damage

    -   □ collaboration with the criminal justice authorities

    -   □ fear of own safety as a reason for offence

    -   □ bad health

    -   □ alcoholism

    -   □ contingent intent

    -   □ exceeded self-defense

    -   □ little probability of reoffending

    -   □ no permanent consequences for the victim

    -   □ Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Mitigating circumstances *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ attempt

    -   □ contribution of the victim (defendant was provoked)

    -   □ preexisting problematic relationship with the victim

    -   □ no criminal record

    -   □ youth/immaturity

    -   □ old age

    -   □ a parent of an unsupported child

    -   □ difficult conditions at the time of growing up

    -   □ orderly life conditions (family, job, apartment)

    -   □ orderly life conditions (family, job, apartment) after committing the offence

    -   □ substantially diminished capacity

    -   □ diminished capacity

    -   □ remoteness of time of the event

    -   □ forgiveness from the victim/victim\'s family

    -   □ guilty plea

    -   □ repentance/remorse

    -   □ apology

    -   □ restitution for damage

    -   □ collaboration with the criminal justice authorities

    -   □ fear of own safety as a reason for offence

    -   □ bad health

    -   □ alcoholism

    -   □ contingent intent

    -   □ exceeded self-defense

    -   □ little probability of reoffending

    -   □ no permanent consequences for the victim

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ no mitigating circumstances

-   • Aggravating circumstances *\[more than one answer is possible\]*:

    -   □ reoffending

    -   □ especially reprehensible offense due to the preexisting relationship with the victim

    -   □ persistence in committing the offence (e.g. multiple stabbing)

    -   □ particularly cruel manner in which the offence was committed

    -   □ lack of regret/remorse

    -   □ alcoholism

    -   □ defendant\'s violence

    -   □ abandoning the victim

    -   □ base motives

    -   □ influencing other participants

    -   □ direct intent

    -   □ permanent consequences for the victim

    -   □ defendant\'s conduct after committing the offense: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ no aggravating circumstances

-   • Does the decision discuss any information (evidence, expert opinions, allegations) regarding neuroscience or defendant\'s brain?

    -   □ yes

    -   □ no

-   • Was neuro-evidence presented at trial?

    -   □ yes

    -   □ no

-   • Who proposed neuro-evidence *\[more than one answer is possible\]*?

    -   □ defense

    -   □ prosecution

    -   □ the court *ex officio*

    -   □ not clear

    -   □ no proposition

-   • Neuro-evidence concerns *\[state neurological condition, brain damage, or other diagnosis\]*: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Which diagnostic methods were proposed *\[more than one answer is possible\]*?

    -   □ brain imaging (e.g. MRI, CT, CAT, PET, SPECT)

    -   □ EEG (electroencephalography)

    -   □ neuropsychological testing

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ not evident

-   • Which diagnostic methods the court appointed expert used *\[more than one answer is possible\]*?

    -   □ brain imaging (e.g. MRI, CT, CAT, PET, SPECT)

    -   □ EEG (electroencephalography)

    -   □ neuropsychological testing

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ not evident

-   • Background of the court appointed expert(s) *\[more than one answer is possible\]:*

    -   □ no neuroscience-related expert was appointed

    -   □ neurologist

    -   □ psychiatrist

    -   □ neuropsychiatrist

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ not evident

-   • Which legal argument did the party want to establish with neuro-evidence *\[more than one answer is possible\]*?

    -   □ insanity

    -   □ substantially diminished capacity

    -   □ diminished capacity

    -   □ unfit for trial

    -   □ fit for trial

    -   □ credibility of the defendant (his/her testimony)

    -   □ criminal sanction

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ not evident

-   • When the intent of the party is to influence criminal sanction with neuro-evidence, which type of sanction does the party suggest?

    -   □ compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution

    -   □ compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty

    -   □ mitigating circumstance

    -   □ aggravated circumstance

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

-   • Which legal outcome did the neuro-evidence [actually]{.ul} affected *\[More than one answer is possible\]?*

    -   □ insanity

    -   □ substantially diminished capacity

    -   □ diminished capacity

    -   □ unfit for trial

    -   □ fit for trial

    -   □ credibility of the defendant (his/her testimony)

    -   □ criminal sanction

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

    -   □ neuro-evidence had no effect

-   • What was the [actual]{.ul} effect of neuro-evidence on criminal sanction?

    -   □ compulsory psychiatric treatment and confinement in a health institution

    -   □ compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty

    -   □ mitigated circumstance

    -   □ aggravated circumstance

    -   □ other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
